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En la época anterior a la Guerra Civil estadounidense, la industria azucarera de Louisiana 
pasó de fabricar cantidades insignificantes de edulcorante a elaborar 264.000 Tn., debido al au-
mento del consumo interno y de su capacidad productiva. Sin embargo, fue incapaz de contrarres-
tar las crecientes exportaciones caribeñas. Este estudio arguye que los hacendados esclavistas de 
dicha región operaban en un mercado muy dinámico, en el que se mostraron muy pronto cultural-
mente mal preparados para competir. Su ética individualista y celosa de su independencia (valores 
procedentes de la esclavitud) obstaculizó sus esfuerzos asociativos y, como resultado, comerciali-
zaron su artículo por separado, saturando la demanda, deprimiendo los precios y debilitando su 
posición particular y colectiva en el negocio. 
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empresarios. 
 
 
 
A cacophony of sounds, voices, shouts, accents, and laughter rang out over 
the New Orleans levee. The shrill peal of steamboat whistles and tolling bells 
further encroached upon the antebellum soundscape as workers, black and white, 
Irish and German, Creole and American toiled along the riverfront manoeuvring 
bales of cotton and manhandling the large hogsheads of sugar that had so recen-
tly arrived from the plantations in New Orleans’ immediate hinterland. A forest 
of masts greeted the visitor as steamers, ships, and flatboats crowded the narrow 
levee crest, lying four and five deep, transporting the produce of the Mississippi 
Valley to the burgeoning markets of the Northeast. Steam towboats plowed upri-
ver from the Gulf of Mexico, piloting vessels of every nation through the chan-
nels of the Mississippi delta and toward the wharves of the nation’s pre-eminent 
southern port. Scattered along the waterfront lay cargoes of pork and beef from 
Ohio, coal from Pittsburgh, lead, lumber, and furs from the upper Mississippi and 
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Allegheny Mountains, and kegs of flour, corn, whisky, and every provision ima-
ginable. But among all the domestic produce lay teas from China, coffee from the 
Indies, and tierces of Caribbean sugar; products that enhanced the Americans 
increasingly cosmopolitan diet, but competed directly with the domestic cane 
sugar industry for a share of the U.S. market. The entire scene astonished visitors 
who left the city amazed by the scale of the riverside market, the extraordinary 
range of commodities traded, and staggered by the multitude of tongues and ac-
cents that resounded along the waterfront. As one observer noted, the «intermi-
nable chant […] and sonorous chorus» of the slaves, laboring at the pace of their 
shouts, hollers, and workplace songs, echoed from one wharf to the next as wes-
tern boatmen and foreign sailors rubbed shoulders with New Orleans’ commer-
cial elite. The veritable «roar» of human interaction peaked during the key tra-
ding months —October to June— when the levee front witnessed an almost un-
paralleled display of goods transported to the city from the frigid climes of the 
upper Midwest to the sultry heat of the tropics. The waterfront wharves might 
have impressed visitors like Charles Lanman and Basil Hall as «one of the won-
ders of this wonderful age», reverberating with «an air of great commercial bus-
tle», but the city’s status as the storehouse of the Mississippi and «the receptacle 
of a hundred climes» convinced both foreigners and Americans alike that New 
Orleans was indeed the «greatest exporting city in the world». This «goal of a 
thousand steamships», one observer noted, fused America’s domestic economy 
with that of the Atlantic world; it integrated the Ohio, Missouri, and Mississippi 
rivers into a network of trade links, drawing farms and plantations in distant and 
isolated portions of America into a vigorous commercial marketplace1. 
———— 
 1 The author wishes to express his gratitude to the Arts and Humanities Research Board of 
the United Kingdom for funding the project «Race and Labour in the Cane Fields: Documenting 
Louisiana Sugar, 1844-1917» (APN, nº 16, 426) from which this paper derives. Descriptions of the 
New Orleans levee are drawn from J.D.B. DEBOW, «The Crescent City», Commercial Review of 
the South and West, 3, Michigan, 1847, pp. 239-42; J.R. CREECY, Scenes in the South and Other 
late Miscellaneous Pieces, Washington D.C., Thomas McGill, 1860, pp. 9-12; B. HALL, Travels in 
North America in the Years 1827 and 1828, Philadelphia, Carey, Lea, & Carey, 1829, p. 286; C. 
LANMAN, Adventures in the Wilds of the United States and British American Provinces (2 vols.), 
Philadelphia, John W. Moore, 1856, t. 2, pp. 203-4; T. POWER, Impressions of America During the 
Years 1833, 1834, and 1835, 2 vols., Philadelphia: Carey, Lea, and Carey, 1836, t. II, pp. 144-5; R. 
BAIRD, View of the Valley of the Mississippi or the Emigrant’s and Traveller’s Guide to the West, 
Philadelphia: H.S. Tanner, 1834, pp. 280-1; G.W. FEATHERSTONHAUGH, Excursion through the 
Slave States, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1844, p. 140; L.B. SHIPPEE (ed.), Bishop Whipple’s 
Southern Diary, 1843-1844, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1937, pp. 95-6; H. LE-
WIS, The Valley of the Mississippi Illustrated, St. Paul, Minnesota Historical Society, 1967 (trans., 
A.H. Poatgieter, ed. B.L. Heilbron, 1th ed. 1854), pp. 400-1, and L. FITZGERALD TASISTRO, Random 
Shots and Southern Breezes, 2 vols., New York, Harper & Brothers, 1842, t. 2, pp. 68-9. On the 
waterfront, also see A. KELMAN, A River and its City: The Nature of Landscape in New Orleans, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 2003, especially chap. 2. Finally, on the soundscape of 
early America, see R.C. RATH, How Early America Sounded, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 
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No where was this truer than in the desolate swamps of southern Louisiana; 
«a remote corner of the world» as planter A.T. Conrad described rural St. Mary 
Parish in the far west of Louisiana’s sugar producing belt. For centuries, the 
meandering bayous of the Mississippi floodplain had been home to native Ame-
ricans who adapted their agriculture to the vagaries of their alluvial landscape 
and the perennial risk of spring freshets and inundation. The rivers and bayous 
that snaked through the region, however, constantly replenished the rich soils 
leaving narrow corridors of highly fertile land that followed the crescents and 
bends of Louisiana’s dense network of watercourses. Despite its advantages, the 
humid climate and lush soils of southern portions of the state were ill-suited for 
short staple cotton, the antebellum South’s principal crop. The fertile alluvium, 
nonetheless, proffered wealth for those who could tame the habitat and convert 
«waste lands into verdant fields», as one nineteenth-century writer observed, and 
reap «stores of gold and silver from the glebe they turned up». But until the in-
troduction of modern frost resistant canes, cane farming on the lower reaches of 
the Mississippi proved a perilous and risky pursuit. Located on the northern rim 
of the Caribbean sugar-producing belt, Louisiana faced a series of overlapping 
meteorological problems. Icy winds from Minnesota swept down the central co-
rridor of the nation, bringing sharp frosts that froze the sucrose-rich juice within 
the canes and rendered it all but worthless. Cane growers faced an almost impos-
sible dilemma —they could plant the majority of their seed crop in January and 
harvest it some nine or ten months later. But in doing so, the slave crews who 
entered the fields in mid to late October harvested immature cane with lower 
sucrose content than that enjoyed by their Caribbean rivals. Alternatively, they 
could wait a few weeks more, maturing their canes, but pitting their fortunes 
against the climes. As William P. Bradburn of the Plaquemine Southern Sentinel 
underscored, the risk of misfortune ultimately defined antebellum sugar farming. 
«In our countryside», he observed, 
 
«The people seem run mad upon the culture of staple products [...] They 
turn the farmers’ life into that of a gambler and speculator. They are dependent 
upon chance, and an evil turn of the cards —a bad season, a fall in prices, or 
some such usual calamity». 
 
Despite such grave counsel, Bradburn observed, planters continued to «run 
mad» funnelling vast sums into land, slaves, and sugar production equipment in 
the sixty years following Etienne Boré’s successful granulation of Louisiana su-
gar in 1793. Transforming the landscape, planters and slaves converted the river 
crests and levee fronts into a network of plantations that stretched from the Gulf 
———— 
2003, and M.M. SMITH, Listening to Nineteenth-Century America, Chapel Hill, University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001. 
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of Mexico in the South to Rapides Parish in central Louisiana and to St. Mary 
Parish in the West2. 
Initially growing cane in the New Orleans hinterland, planters swiftly expan-
ded along the Mississippi River to Baton Rouge. With hardier cane varieties in-
creasingly available and steam power reducing the length of time it previously 
took to grind canes with animal powered mills, sugar planters successfully culti-
vated lands in the hill country north of the state capitol and farmed cane where it 
had previously been deemed unfeasible to do so. To the west, the antebellum 
sugar industry similarly expanded along Bayous Teche and Lafourche and the 
many tributaries that fed into them. Reasonable cane prices combined with fede-
ral tariff protection encouraged further experimentation in the 1840s as the indus-
try gradually expanded, occupying new lands, draining swamps, and reclaiming 
the marshy landscape for the sugar masters. By the eve of the Civil War, the an-
tebellum industry reached its geographic and production limits. Ultimately cons-
trained by the volume of available land and by cane sugar’s susceptibility to 
frost, the industry nonetheless posted remarkable growth. By mid-century, some 
125,000 enslaved African Americans toiled on 1500 estates producing 250,000 
hogsheads of raw sugar (each weighing between 1000 and 1200 lbs). In the fo-
llowing decade, planters consolidated their holdings, smaller producers left the 
industry, and the total number of sugar estates declined to 1300. Consolidation, 
however, did not check overall expansion. Infact, by 1853, Louisiana planters 
produced a quarter of the world’s exportable sugar. Enthusiastically fanning re-
gional pride, Representative Miles Taylor announced that such progress «is wit-
hout parallel in the United States, or indeed in the world in any branch of indus-
try». After several poor crops in the mid 1850s, production recovered in the final 
antebellum years and as the nation descended into Civil War, planters celebrated 
the bumper 1861 harvest of 460,000 hogsheads. It was the last crop made entirely 
by slave labor and the crowning moment of the antebellum sugar masters3. 
———— 
 2 «A.T. Conrad to David Weeks», 16 December 1827, Weeks (David & Family) Papers, 
Louisiana State University Libraries, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley Collections, Baton 
Rouge, LA (hereafter LSU); Planters’ Banner, Franklin, 16 March 1848, and Southern Sentinel, 
Plaquemine, 22 June 1850. On the historical geography of the cane world, see: S.B. HILLIARD, 
«Site Characteristic and Spatial Stability of the Louisiana Sugarcane Industry», Agricultural Histo-
ry, 53, Berkeley, 1979, pp. 254-69, and J.B. REHDER, Delta Sugar: Louisiana’s Vanishing Planta-
tion Landscape, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, pp. 1-59. On early Louisiana, 
also see D.H. USNER, Jr., Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lo-
wer Mississippi Valley Before 1783, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1992, 
pp. 149-90. 
 3 De Bow’s Review, 1, New Orleans, 1846, pp. 55-6. On the growth of the sugar industry, see 
R. FOLLETT, The Sugar Masters: Planters and Slaves in Louisiana’s Cane World, 1820-1860, Ba-
ton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 2005, especially chap, 1, also «On the Edge of Mo-
dernity: Louisiana’s Landed Elites in the Nineteenth-Century Sugar Country», E. DAL LAGO and R. 
HALPERN (eds.), The American South and the Italian Mezzogiorno: Essays in Comparative History, 
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Having shored-up the colossal power of the Mississippi, converted swamps 
into plantations, and tamed the landscape, if not the climate, planters in Louisia-
na’s cane world transformed their region and economy. No longer so remote, 
southern Louisiana’s economic future lay with the nation’s predilection for swee-
teners and with the cut and thrust of commercial competition; a world sugar mar-
ket where Louisianans competed against their Caribbean rivals, marketing their 
sugars in a dozen cities throughout the nation, and vying for their share of the 
market. This essay examines the growth in demand for cane sugar in the United 
States and the attempts made by Louisiana’s elite to control the vagaries of price 
through their marketing strategies. Yet despite their efforts, the plantocracy pro-
ved singularly incapable of sheltering themselves from the peaks and troughs of 
global competition and price change. They rarely cooperated for their common 
good, instead pursuing highly individualistic marketing plans. As we shall see, 
the social ethic of southern slaveholding undermined the planters’ capacity to 
cooperate and compete in the increasingly competitive domestic market. Antebe-
llum sugar planters were unquestionably capitalist in their vision and invested in 
highly developed plantations, but as a generation of historical scholarship has 
shown, the culture of American slaveholding ultimately bred jealous independen-
ce, a myopic focus on the individual, one’s own authority, and upon personal 
liberty. Acquisitive and market-oriented, expansionist slaveholders spoke a lin-
gua franca of modernity, but tempered it with paternalism, planter hegemony, 
and a region-wide commitment to the preservation of liberty, slavery, and repu-
blican precepts of independence and virtue. Yet above all, the planters’ self-
identity remained anchored to the plantation and to their role as slaveholders and 
labor lords. Capital expenditure on a plantation mansion, more slaves, or the la-
test machinery heightened the planters’ sense of mastery over land, labor, and 
sugar, though public cooperation did little to exalt their power. The sugar elite 
accordingly remained deaf to the calls for united action in the market —they dis-
patched their sugars without reference to one another, grumbling continuously 
———— 
Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2002, pp. 73-94; J.C. SITTERSON, Sugar Country: The Cane Sugar Industry 
in the South, 1753-1950, Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1953, pp. 13-44, and P.A. 
CHAMPOMIER, Statement of the Sugar Crop Made in Louisiana, 1845-1846, New Orleans, Cook, 
Young, & Co., 1846, p. 35; 1849-1850, p. 51; 1859-1860, p. 39, and 1861-1862, p. 39. On northern 
expansion and increased yields, see De Bow’s Review, 2, New Orleans, 1846, p. 442, and 3, 1847, 
p. 414; Alexandria Democrat, reprinted in Planters’ Banner, Franklin, 13 January 1848, and Ame-
rican Agriculturist, 9, Indianapolis, 1850, p. 351. Postwar events are summarized in R. FOLLETT 
and R. HALPERN, «From Slavery to Freedom in Louisiana’s Sugar Country: Changing Labor Sys-
tems and Workers’ Power, 1861-1913», B. MOITT (ed.), Sugar, Slavery, and Society: Perspectives 
on the Caribbean, India, the Mascarenes, and the United States, Gainesville, University Press of 
Florida, 2004, chap. 7, and L. FERLEGER, «Farm Mechanization in the Southern Sugar Sector after 
the Civil War», Louisiana History, 23, Lafayette, 1982, pp. 21-34, but above all, see J. RODRÍGUEZ, 
Reconstruction in the Cane Fields: From Slavery to Free Labor in Louisiana’s Sugar Parishes, 
1862-1880, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 2001. 
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about prices and factors, yet watching their market position slide. Ready to risk a 
fortune on more slaves or steam-powered mills, Louisiana’s sugar elite embraced 
a blinkered, estate-focused brand of southern capitalism. It enabled them to pro-
duce large crops and ruthlessly exploit their slaves, though it proved ill suited for 
a market where cooperation might have yielded still greater riches. The peripate-
tic New York journalist Frederick Law Olmsted astutely deduced the Louisiana 
sugar masters’ central flaw. «Individuals at the South», he concluded, «were en-
terprising, but they could only move themselves». Herein lay the planters’ central 
dilemma in marketing their sugar crop —they remained, as ever, a disparate 
group of individuals4. 
———— 
 4 F.L. OLMSTED, A Journey in the Seaboard Slave States, (2 vols.), New York, G. P. Putnam, 
1904 (1th ed. 1856), t. 2, pp. 274-5. The literature on planter identity is extensive, but for a good 
historiographical overview, see M.D. SMITH, Debating Slavery: Economy and Society in the Ante-
bellum American South, Cambridge, University of Cambridge Press, 1998. The principal works 
advocating an essentially non-capitalist perspective on planter identity include, but are not limited 
to, E.D. GENOVESE, The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the 
Slave South, New York, Vintage Books, 1965, and E.D. GENOVESE and E. FOX-GENOVESE, Fruits 
of Merchant Capital: Slavery and Bourgeois Property in the Rise and Expansion of Capitalism, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 1983, and The Slaveholder’s Dilemma: Freedom and Pro-
gress in Southern Conservative Thought, 1820-1860, Columbia: University of South Carolina Pre-
ss, 1992. By contrast, Fogel, Engerman, Oakes, and Dusinberre have stressed the profit-orientation 
of slaveholders and the capitalist nature of slavery. In later works, however, Oakes, Dusinberre, and 
Bowman argued that southern planters were intensely capitalist, but not democratic and sought to 
maintain strict social hierarchies at the expense of liberal capitalism. See R.W. FOGEL and S.L. 
ENGERMAN, Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery, New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1974; R.W. FOGEL, Without Consent or Contract: The Rise and Fall of American Slavery, 
New York, W.W. Norton, 1989; J. OAKES, The Ruling Race: A History of the American Slavehol-
ders, New York, Vintage Books, 1982, and Slavery and Freedom: An Interpretation of the Old 
South, New York, Knopf, 1990; S.D. BOWMAN, Masters and Lords: Mid-Nineteenth-Century U.S. 
Planters and Prussian Junkers, New York, Oxford University Press, 1993, and W. DUSINBERRE, 
Them Dark Days: Slavery in the American Rice Swamps, New York, Oxford University Press, 
1996. On the southern fixation with liberty and independence, also see J.W. HARRIS, Plain Folk 
and Gentry in a Slave Society: White Liberty and Black Slavery in Augusta’s Hinterlands, Middle-
town, Conn., Wesleyan University Press, 1985; W.J. COOPER, Liberty and Slavery: Southern Poli-
tics to 1860, New York, McGraw Hill, 1986, and L.K. FORD, Origins of Southern Radicalism: The 
South Carolina Upcountry, 1800-1860, New York, Oxford University Press, 1988. More recently, 
historians present southern slavery as a complex hybrid of capitalist and pre-capitalist values where 
slave owners demonstrated capitalist pretensions with a labor system and social values that espou-
sed paternalistic and patriarchal values, these include: C. MORRIS, Becoming Southern: The Evolu-
tion of a Way of Life, Warren Country and Vicksburg, Mississippi, 1770-1860, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1995; M.M. SMITH, Mastered by the Clock: Time, Slavery, and Freedom in the 
American South, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1997; J.R. YOUNG, Domestica-
ting Slavery: The Master Class in Georgia and South Carolina, 1670-1837, Chapel Hill, University 
of North Carolina Press, 1999; J.D. MILLER, South by Southwest: Planter Emigration and Identity 
in the Slave South, Charlottesville, University Press of Virginia, 2002, and W.K. SCARBOROUGH, 
Masters of the Big House: Elite Slaveholders of the Mid-Nineteenth-Century South, Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana State University Press, 2003. 
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The rapid growth in the national market for sugar rested foursquare upon its 
growing affordability and its increased use in all parts of the American diet. As 
one Cincinnati paper remarked in the mid-1850s, the increase in sugar consump-
tion far outstripped population growth, with the annual demand for sucrose ex-
ceeding 900 million pounds, a four-fold increase in twenty years. «That it is a 
real absolute change in the habits of life, cannot be doubted» the paper intoned 
on the lifestyle change which propelled the nineteenth-century sugar revolution. 
Indeed, as one further editorialist added, the increase in US sugar consumption 
had unleashed 
 
«A complete revolution in the sugar interest of the world [...] and the ques-
tion is a grave one, whether the production of the article can keep pace with its 
consumption». 
 
For Louisianans, this would be answered in the negative, but the market op-
portunity afforded by the sugar revolution and the gilt-edged promise of riches 
nevertheless lured planters and traders alike into the domestic sugar-producing 
industry. So attractive were long-term market prospects that having monopolized 
the best bottomland in the Louisiana cane parishes, planters experimented with 
the crop in Mississippi, Alabama, but most extensively in Texas. Louisiana’s 
antebellum lords responded uneasily to these inroads on their regional economy, 
but the boom in domestic sugar consumption would encourage both natives and 
strangers to engage in and vie for a share of the U.S. market5. 
At the axis of Louisiana’s economic fortune lay rising demand, augmented in-
comes, and the transformation of the relative position of sucrose from a luxury in 
the eighteenth century to a staple commodity during the middle decades of the nine-
teenth. Much like Britain before it, American sugar consumption escalated swiftly. 
By 1831, for instance, every American consumed 13.33 pounds of sugar while only 
a decade later, most adult citizens consumed 18 pounds of sugar per person. This 
marked increase in consumption continued apace through the antebellum era, and 
by 1850 the per capita consumption of sugar surpassed 30 lbs. per annum. In 1853, 
Americans enjoyed a bumper and particularly gluttonous year when they consumed 
over 36 lbs. of sugar per head and throughout the decade, sugar continued to sell 
briskly in the domestic market. Only the English retained a sweeter tooth than the 
———— 
 5 The Sugar Planter, Port Allen, 26 January 1856, and Southern Sentinel, Plaquemine, 22 
December 1855. On land/wealth concentration, see A.W. NIEMI, Jr., «Inequality in the Distribution 
of Slave Wealth: The Cotton South and Other Southern Agricultural Regions», Journal of Econo-
mic History, 37, Cambridge, UK, 1977, pp. 747-53; R.W. SHUGG, Origins of Class Struggle: A 
Social History of White Farmers and Laborers during Slavery and After, 1840-1875, Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana State University, 1939, especially pp. 76-156; H.L. COLES, «Some Notes on Slaveow-
nerhip and Landownership in Louisiana, 1850-1860», Journal of Southern History, 9, Hanover, 
Penn., 1943, pp. 381-94. 
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Americans and by the late antebellum decades, both Britain and the United States 
consumed thousands of pounds of crystalline sugar every year. Domestic U.S. 
consumption proved so great that it far outstripped Russia, Ireland, France, 
Holland, and Spain who modestly consumed approximately 6 lbs. of sugar per 
head per annum. Antebellum cook books, in particular, encouraged the extensive 
use of sugar within the American diet, particularly in the preparation of pies, 
tarts, and fruit preservation. The increased use of imported Brazilian coffee spu-
rred sucrose consumption still further. Sugary food, however, was not only the 
domain of elite or urbane Americans with ready access to grocers. Published just 
a few years after the Civil War, Mrs. Hill’s New Cook Book recorded that the 
humble sweet potato pie required «a thick layer of good brown sugar» while its 
sister sweet potato pudding needed six ounces of powdered sugar. Sweet potato 
salad required a teaspoon of sugar, while baked sweet potatoes, Mrs. Hill pro-
claimed, tasted finer with an extra dash of sugar. If the family remained hungry 
after so many sweet potato dishes, then one could easily turn to Mrs. Hill’s Se-
cession Pudding, a candied delight that included «three cups of dry crushed su-
gar». In antebellum America, no crop or dish proved humbler or simpler than the 
sweet potato. Prepared in countless ways throughout the nation, candied yams, 
sweet potato pies, and even potato vine tea, all required the addition of a few 
ounces of sugar. As the Boston Traveller noted in 1856, the demand for refined 
sugar had increased ten-fold in the space of a few years as the city’s rum distille-
ries and refineries required ever-larger quantities of raw sugar. Present on kitchen 
tables from Massachusetts to Mississippi, powered and loafsugar increasingly 
served as an integral part of the middle class or yeoman diet6. 
The American fixation with sugar, Hunt's Merchant Magazine declared in the 
early 1850s, reflected the «improved prosperity [...] of the United States». Quantita-
———— 
 6 For key works on demand see, P.A. COCLANIS, The Shadow of a Dream: Economic Life and 
Death in the South Carolina Low Country, 1670-1920, New York, Oxford University Press, 1989, 
especially chap. 3; also his «Distant Thunder: The Creation of a World Market in Rice and the Trans-
formation it Wrought», American Historical Review, 98, Durham, 1993, pp. 1050-78. For consump-
tion figures, see Hunt's Merchant Magazine, 39, New York, 1858, p. 550; Farmer's Cabinet And 
American Herd Book, 2, Philadelphia, 1837, p. 78; Houma Ceres, New Orleans, 30 August 1856; 
Weekly Advocate, Baton Rouge, 29 March 1857, and Journal of Agriculture, 1, New York, 1845, p. 
281. On sugar and dietary change, S.W. MINTZ, Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern 
History, New York, Penguin Books, 1985; W.A. WOLOSON, Refined Tastes: Sugar, Confectionary, 
and Consumers in Nineteenth-Century America, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002; 
E.T. FORDYCE, «Cookbooks of the 1800s», K. GROVER (ed.), Dining in America, 1850-1900, Am-
herst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1987, pp. 93-4; J.G. TAYLOR, Eating, Drinking, and Visiting 
in the South: An Informal History, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1982, p. 58; U.B. 
PHILLIPS, Life and Labor in the Old South, New York, Little, Brown & Co., 1929, p. 229; E.N. 
MCINTOSH, American Food Habits in Historical Perspective, Westport, Conn., Praeger Books, 
1995, p. 83; D.L. FOWLER (ed.), Mrs. Hill’s Southern Practical Cookery and Receipt Book, Colum-
bia, University of South Carolina Press, 1995, pp. 195, 253, and 263-4, and Boston Traveller, nº 9, 
Boston, 1856 quoted in Houma Ceres, New Orleans, 26 July 1856. 
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tive data on regional income trends support this conclusion, for between 1840 and 
1860, the average national per capita income for free people increased from $109 to 
$144. Residents in the Northeast maintained particularly high per capita earnings 
though all areas of the nation posited expanding income and wealth levels. Signifi-
cantly, for the middle and working classes, real wages for both artisans and common 
laborers rose by 0.4 to 1.6 percent per annum. In this context, sugar proved highly 
income and price elastic; namely, the quantity demanded moved sharply as income 
changed. Thus while antebellum incomes increased by approximately 30 percent, 
sugar consumption rose from 194 million pounds of sugar in 1840 to 745 million 
pounds in 1858, an increase of some 282 percent. Sugar certainly became more af-
fordable as the century advanced, though it was principally the dietary transforma-
tion and sugar consumption patterns that underpinned America’s spiralling sucrose 
demand from the late 1840s to the mid-1850s7.  
With greater disposable income available to middle and working-class Ame-
ricans, the cost of sugar declined in both real and relative terms over the antebe-
llum era as sweeteners increasingly entered the mainstream diet and the wholesa-
le price of sugar gradually declined. Figure 1 indicates the essential downward 
momentum in the wholesale price of sugar throughout the first half of the nine-
teenth century. And whether one focuses on specific sugars —be it relatively 
cheap domestic «plantation» grade sugar in New Orleans or more costly «prime 
New Orleans» grade sugars in New York— prices declined sharply from the 
highs of wartime years, during which the British strangled Caribbean trade, to the 
relative lows of the 1840s and early 1850s. Inclement weather and a hurricane 
destroyed Louisiana’s crop in 1856 causing a temporary price hike, but the overw-
helming pattern of sugar prices in the major eastern and southern markets is one of 
relative decline. With increased supply in both domestic and imported sugars, dimi-
nishing prices, and gradually improving wages (particularly during the 1840s), the 
real cost of sugar relative to income altered substantially. For artisans, the price of a 
pound of wholesale sugar dropped from 9 percent of their daily wage in the 1820s to 
just 3 or 4 percent in the 1840s and 1850s. Common laborers likewise watched the 
———— 
 7 Hunt’s Merchant Magazine, 27, New York, 1852, p. 679; R.W. FOGEL [4], p. 85; R.A. EAS-
TERLIN, «Regional Income Trends, 1840-1950», S.E. HARRIS (ed.), American Economic History, New 
York, McGraw-Hill, 1961, pp. 525-54; R.A. MARGO, «Wages and Prices During the Antebellum Pe-
riod: A Survey and New Evidence», R.E. GALLMAN and J.J. WALLIS (eds.), American Economic 
Growth and Standards of Living before the Civil War, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992, p. 
183, and C. GOLDIN and R.A. MARGO, «Wages, Prices, and Labor Markets before the Civil War», C. 
GOLDIN and R.A. MARGO (eds.), Strategic Factors in Nineteenth Century American Economic History: 
A Volume to Honor Robert W. Fogel, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992, pp. 76-80. Signifi-
cantly, the shift from luxury to staple status in sugar consumption proves consistent with parallel shifts 
in consumer behaviour, for as per capita income rises, demand frequently shifts from basic food items 
to higher value products, including at this point former working-class luxuries like sugar. On income 
elasticity and food, see P.A. COCLANIS [6], p. 53; T.W. SCHULTZ, The Economic Organization of Agri-
culture, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1953, pp. 71-4; and J.W. MELLOR, The Economics of 
Agricultural Development, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. 57-80. 
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price of sugar decline sharply to their income levels. Whereas a pound of sugar cost 
as much as 16 or 17 percent of their daily wage in the 1820s, it dropped to between 
six and nine percent of their income in the later periods. Figure 2 reflects this grap-
hically, underscoring the decline in the price of sugar relative to daily wage rates. 
Indeed the signal transformation of sugar from luxury to staple ensured that once 
hooked, Americans continued to purchase their sweeteners even during the relative 
price surges of 1844, 1847, and most particularly during 1856 and 1857. Although 
one should guard against overestimating the quality of life in industrializing Ameri-
ca, common laborers increasingly possessed an income stream that provided a mo-
dest living. As one Irishman sang of his pay: 
 
«I entered with them for a season, my monthly pay for to draw, 
And being in very good humor, I often sang Erin Go Bragh. 
Our provision it was very plenty, to complain we’d no reason at all, 
I had money in every pocket, while working on the canal». 
 
Whether this immigrant spooned sugar into his tea remains unknown, but cer-
tainly by 1833, one Philadelphia canal laborer’s family purchased some sugar 
along with other dietary staples; some bread, a small amount of meat, several 
pints of milk, and a half-bushel of potatoes. Through the gradual combination of 
rising income and declining real and relative costs, mid-nineteenth century Ame-
ricans enjoyed a period of comparative prosperity as they spent less on food and 
housing than their antecedents and possessed the financial means to purchase a 
broader range of retail items, including sugar8. 
 
———— 
 8 Sugar price data for Figures 1 and 2 drawn from «Wholesale Prices of Selected Commodi-
ties», U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 
1957, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960, Series E 101-12, p. 124. Further 
data on «plantation grade» and «prime New Orleans grade» drawn from A.H. COLE, Wholesale 
Commodity Prices in the United States, 1700-1861, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 
1938, pp. 192-357. For comparative price series on sugar see N. DEERR, The History of Sugar (2 
vols.), London, Chapman & Hall, 1950, t. 2, pp. 524-33; on other commodities, see D.C. NORTH, The 
Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-1860, New York, W.W. Norton, 1966, pp. 239-40. For 
nominal daily wage rates of artisans and common laborers (used in Figure 2), consult R.A. MARGO 
and G.C. VILLAFLOR, «Growth of Wages in Antebellum America: New Evidence», Journal of Eco-
nomic History, 47, Cambridge, UK, 1987, pp. 873-95. The figures used in calculating mean wages for 
Figure 2 are the average of daily wage rates in the Northeast, Midwest, South Atlantic, and South 
Central states. On the immigrant’s consumption of sugar, see P. WAY, Common Labor: Workers and 
the Digging of North American Canals, 1780-1860, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, 
p. 105, and R.O. CUMMINGS, The American and His Food: A History of Food Habits in the United 
States, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1940, pp. 27-8. Finally, research on anthropometric 
history demonstrates that rising income significantly —though not entirely— shapes nutritional and 
stature gains. For an overview of this debate, see R.H. STECKEL, «Stature and the Standard of Living», 
Journal of Economic Literature, 33, Pittsburgh, 1995, pp. 1903-40. 
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FIGURE 2 
Price of Wolesale Sugar (One lb) and Percentage of Nominal Daily Wage  
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For Louisiana’s cane planting elite, the economic and dietary changes that 
propelled their industry forward promised untold riches. Daniel Dennet, proprie-
tor and editor of one of the most prominent agricultural papers in the region, 
plainly realized the centrality of the working person’s enhanced buying power. 
Immediately below the masthead on Franklin’s Planters’ Banner and adjoining 
stories of political and economic nature lay the oration «Give to the Labor of 
America, the Market of America». Quintessentially representing the market 
orientation of its readers, Dennett faithfully spoke to an industry whose financial 
success rested on supplying the laboring people of the North with the sugar they 
required. But for all their bravado and august claims that the industry could readi-
ly produce 400,000 hogsheads per annum, if only «fair inducements were held 
out to the capitalists», Louisiana’s cane belt supplied on average 46 percent of 
the burgeoning national demand from 1837 to 1858. On occasion, notably in the 
mid-1840s, Louisiana farmers produced over 60 percent of the national demand, 
but as sugar consumption rose steeply in the 1850s, the domestic sugar industry 
struggled to maintain its market share from its relatively limited agricultural 
lands. Poor domestic crops in the mid to late 1850s forced sugar brokers to rely 
even more extensively on Caribbean imports as Louisianans nervously watched 
Cuban and Puerto Rican sugars arrive on New York and Philadelphia wharves in 
increasing volume. The scale of Spanish-Caribbean imports escalated swiftly, 
particularly those of Cuba. In 1840, for instance, Cubans exported almost 50 mi-
llion pounds of sugar to the United States; a decade later this figure had surpas-
sed 125 million pounds and during the 1850s, Havana and New York-based 
shippers conducted a flourishing trade. In 1851 alone, longshoremen working on 
the Hudson and East River unloaded 94,000 hogsheads of sugar (each containing 
approximately 1000 to 1200 pounds) and 188,000 boxes of sugar (each contai-
ning 400 pounds) from Cuba. Six years later, some 150,000 Cuban hogsheads 
were received in Manhattan and on New Year’s Eve 1860, officials at the Port of 
New York calculated that 230,000 hogsheads and 165,000 boxes of Cuban sugar 
had arrived during the calendar year; a grand total of 171,000 tons or 380 million 
pounds of sugar. Added to that lay another 22,000 tons of Puerto Rican sugar that 
waterfront workers unloaded onto New York’s crowded quays. Louisiana’s entire 
crop of 228,000 hogsheads simply could not match the volume of imported Ca-
ribbean sugars that stevedores and draymen along the Atlantic seaboard heaved 
onto carts bound for warehouses and sugar refineries. Little wonder then that 
Louisiana’s sugar elite quailed at the prospect of annexing Cuba in the 1850s and 
the introduction of duty-free competition with their Caribbean competitors.9 
———— 
 9 Planters’ Banner, Franklin, 13 December 1849, and Red River Whig, Alexandria, 6 Februa-
ry 1841. Data on Louisiana production to national consumption, from Hunt's Merchant Magazine, 
27, New York, 1852, p. 681; U.S. PATENT OFFICE, Annual Report Of The Commissioner of Patents 
For The Year 1858, Washington, D.C., James B. Steedman, 1859, p. 233, and P.A. CHAMPOMIER 
[3], 1851-1858. On Caribbean competition (especially New York), J.D.B. DEBOW, The Industrial 
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In reality, and as Louisianans well understood, only the maintenance of fede-
ral tariff protection ensured profits. The tariff was, planter Alexander Porter de-
duced, «a question of life and death with us in Louisiana». But for many outside 
observers, the tariff cocooned sugar planters from market competition and artifi-
cially kept the price of imported sugars above the domestic article. As planters 
complained, however, higher operating costs in Louisiana —than those enjoyed 
by West Indian producers— ensured that sugar could only be profitably made for 
5 ½ cents whereas Caribbean sugar returned a profit at 3 cents a pound. High 
capital investment in land, labor, machinery, and supplies combined with compa-
ratively poorer yields per acre than those of their competitors ensured that Loui-
siana sugar proved relatively expensive to produce. Planter Moses Liddell lamen-
ted this predicament, stating that cheaply manufactured West Indian imports rea-
dily supplied the Eastern port cities and 
 
«This being the case, there is little doubt a great many adventurers in the 
sugar business [...] will break up and go at cotton». 
 
Liddell’s predictions proved accurate as autonomous and individualistic «ad-
venturers» left the sugar trade once prices dwindled. But without the duty on 
foreign sugar, cane growers predicted an even grimmer future where internatio-
nal competition would bring the native industry to its knees whilst Cuban produ-
ce filled the sugar bowls of America10. 
Tariff protection, however, did not shield Louisianans from the volatility of 
the market and price surges, nor did it protect them from heightened competition 
with keenly priced Caribbean imports. Indeed, there is little evidence to suggest 
that sugar planters conducted much long-term economic forecasting. They plan-
ted their canes in January, harvested them from October to December, and dispo-
sed of the crop shortly afterwards. Given the instability in sugar prices and the 
unpredictable risk of climatic damage to the cane crops, short-range planning 
———— 
Resources, etc., of the Southern and Western States, 3 vols., New Orleans, De Bow’s Review, 
1853, t. II, p. 312, and P.A. CHAMPOMIER [3], 1851-1852, p. 49; 1857-1858, pp. 41-2, and 1860-
1861, pp. 41-2. On the pro-Cuba movement, see F.L. OLMSTED [4], pp. 311-2, and R.E. MAY, The 
Southern Dream of a Caribbean Empire, 1854-1861, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University 
Press, 1973, pp. 46-76. 
10 On the tariff, W.H. STEPHENSON and A. PORTER, Whig Planter of Old Louisiana, Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1934, p. 27; J. ROBERTSON, A Few Months in America, 
London, Longman & Co., 1855, pp. 88-90, and «Moses Liddell to St. John R. Liddell», 19 June 
1848, and 27 August 1849, Liddell (Moses, St. John R. & Family) Papers, LSU. Also see D.O. 
WHITTEN, «Tariff and Profit in the Antebellum Sugar Industry», Business History Review, 44, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1970, pp. 226-33; J.G. TREGLE, Jr., «Louisiana and the Tariff, 1816-1846», 
Louisiana Historical Quarterly, 25, New Orleans, 1942, pp. 24-148; L.C. GRAY, History of Agri-
culture in the Southern United States to 1860, 2 vols., Washington D.C., Carnegie Institute of Was-
hington, 1933, t. 2, pp. 747-8. 
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ultimately proved entirely prudent for an industry, James Stirling observed that 
more nearly «approaches the nature of gambling». The precariousness and risk of 
sugar farming fostered a sense of immediacy among planters who faced three 
options for marketing their sugars. They either sold their crop or consignments of 
it on «plantation» to itinerant buyers who removed it from the estate and marke-
ted it at their own risk. Alternatively, they might freight their sugars to an Atlan-
tic seaport to be marketed there, or more commonly, they could forward their 
crop to factors in New Orleans. Once there, levee front regulations ensured that 
any sugar landed in New Orleans had to be sold within 36 hours or else warehou-
sed at the planters’ expense. The effect of this arrangement exacerbated the plan-
ters’ weak position in the market as factors expedited the quickest sale possible, 
often to the detriment of price. And with planters shipping their sugars to New 
Orleans almost simultaneously, a packed levee and a glutted market promised 
still lower returns. As cane growers bemoaned, 
 
«Will the Louisiana sugar planters avail themselves of what seems to be 
poor compensation for years of toil?». 
 
Will they continue to dispatch their crops into a «market over which neither 
they nor their agents have any control», or withhold their crops in the prospect of 
higher prices? Although some planters attempted the latter, the majority conti-
nued to sell their sugars from November to May and take the best terms availa-
ble, be it on the levee or with commercial agents touring the plantation belt. The 
latter frequently offered the New Orleans price, minus transportation costs to the 
city. Revenue garnered was then immediately employed to service the substantial 
debts and innumerable credit notes that accrued in sugar farming. As one planter 
observed, cane growers are, 
 
«Compelled by force of circumstances to sell so soon as the sugar can lea-
ve the purgatory, to meet their obligations which must be met, or their credit is 
gone». 
 
Beyond badgering their representatives in Congress to hold firm on tariff pro-
tection, the cane planters ultimately occupied an unenviable position as price 
takers in the domestic sugar market. Planter conservatism thus conspired with 
established marketing and credit re-payment patterns to render the sugar commu-
nity relatively powerless to protect themselves from price oscillation and increa-
sed Caribbean competition11. 
———— 
11 J. STIRLING, Letters from the Slave States, London, John W. Parker, 1857, pp. 181-2; Sout-
hern Sentinel, Plaquemine, 22 December 1855, and The Sugar Planter, Port Allen, 1 October 1859. 
On the concept of the sugar planter as a price-taker who wielded little power over the vagaries of 
the market, see M.D. SCHMITZ, «Economies of Scale and Farm Size in the Antebellum Sugar Sec-
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By the mid 1840s, the loose hold planters had previously enjoyed over the 
national sugar trade seemed to be slipping out of their grasp. In response, regio-
nal newspaper editors urged their readers to cooperate and gain a margin of inde-
pendence in their market. Above all, they counseled against the ruinous effect of 
marketing sugar en masse. As the Franklin Planters’ Banner noted: «Why, then, 
should we be so blind as to press our crops upon the market?» The answer, editor 
Robert Wilson explained lay in the scarcity of mercantile information, the specu-
lative manner of New Orleans’ merchants, and the planters’ tendency to «press a 
falling glutted market». The principal error, Wilson added, lay in the planters 
habit of competing against one another «as to who shall reach soonest our chief 
market with raw undrained sugar» before the purchasers actually required it. 
Such an error merely left the crop in the power of speculators to «give us from 
their bounty what price they please». As noted in the New Orleans Bee, the rules 
of supply and demand simply did not function along the levee —supply conti-
nued, irrespective of demand. Planter G. DeBouillon of Iberville Parish explained 
this phenomenon, adding that merchants— who sometimes relied on inaccurate 
estimates of the size and quality forthcoming crop —urged their planter-clients to 
harvest their crops early and cash in on good prices. Frightening some producers 
with the prospect of low prices in the New Year, commission merchants fuelled 
local rivalries as planters dispatched their crews to the fields and their sugars to 
New Orleans. Once there, «down goes sugar and down goes the price» DeBoui-
llon seethed. But the merchants’ advice, this planter exclaimed, proved more than 
self-serving for speculators bought sugar in November before warehousing it 
until March and subsequently profiting from advanced prices. This «unauthorized 
assumption of power [by] a self-constituted tribunal», another planter fumed, 
«determine[s] whether we are or not to be remunerated for our labor». Although 
planter-factor relations proved largely cordial in day-to-day business relations, 
———— 
tor», Journal of Economic History, 37, Cambridge, UK, 1977, pp. 961-2; J.C. SITTERSON, «Finan-
cing and Marketing the Sugar Crop of the Old South», Journal of Southern History, 10, Hanover, 
Penn., 1944, pp. 188-99, and W. PRICHARD, «Routine on a Louisiana Sugar Plantation under the 
Slavery Regime», Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 14, Urbana, Ill., 1927, p. 177. The notion 
of the antebellum farmer as a price-taker receives further attention in G.C. FITE, «Marketing Sout-
hern Staples: Comment», Agricultural History, 56, Berkeley, 1982, p. 22; M. ROTHSTEIN, «Antebe-
llum Wheat and Cotton Exports: A Contrast in Marketing Organization and Economic Develop-
ment», Agricultural History, 40, Berkeley, 1966, pp. 91-100, and J.R. KILLICK, «The Cotton Opera-
tions of Alexander Brown and Sons in the Deep South, 1820-1860», Journal of Southern History, 
43, Hanover, Penn., 1977, pp. 169-94. On the specific role of factors, see H.D. WOODMAN, King 
Cotton and His Retainers: Financing and Marketing the Cotton Crop of the South, 1800-1925, 
Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1990 (repr.), and R.H. KILBOURNE, Jr., Debt, In-
vestment, Slaves: Credit Relations in East Feliciana Parish, Louisiana, 1825-1885, Tuscaloosa, 
University of Alabama Press, 1995, especially pp. 16-48; and on banking, G.D. GREEN, Finance 
and Economic Development in the Old South: Louisiana Banking, 1804-1861, Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 1972, and L. SCHWEIKART, Banking in the American South from the Age of Jack-
son to Reconstruction, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1987. 
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depressed sugar prices, glutted markets, and the thirty-six hour sale rule in New 
Orleans bred planter suspicion and resentment. Above all, they resented being 
«nabobed over» in antebellum parlance by refiners, speculators, and unscrupu-
lous merchants who inaccurately estimated the crop and ill-predicted price chan-
ge. The planters heightened sensitivity to their honor and their acute sense of 
individualism made them particularly resentful of wealthy merchant nabobs who 
might transgress their personal authority and challenge their independence. Abo-
ve all, they proved especially irritable when faced by a «conclave» of merchants 
who «enriched themselves at our expense» and exercised final authority on the 
value of the planters’ crop and the size of their profits. Some planters and edito-
rialists, like Robert Wilson, urged cooperation as part of a «united action», while 
others advocated «union and intercourse» among the plantocracy. The «fatal 
habit» of Louisiana’s elite, one Jefferson Parish planter observed, is that «of so 
many people wrapped up in their own individuality». Readers of the Capitolian 
Vis-à-Vis might have concurred with this prescient observation. Pointedly spea-
king to the structural problems within the sugar community, the paper’s editoria-
lists lamented that 
 
«There is neither union, co-operation or friendly association existing, each 
person pursuing his own plan, prosecuting his own theories, and perpetuating a 
great deal of mischief». 
 
Exasperatedly calling for collaboration and regional association, newspaper 
editors counselled the sugar masters to protect their interests from «ruinous com-
petition» by prudent management and sagacious marketing12. 
However good such advice appeared in principal, Louisiana’s sugar commu-
nity remained singularly deaf to it. As one editor bluntly put it, the planting com-
munity proved «wholly indifferent as well as blind to their own interest», 
suffering «for a want of some mutual understanding among themselves». Colla-
boration ultimately proved a dead-letter in the slave South, and nowhere more so 
than in the debates over the creation of an independent warehouse, where plan-
ters could store their sugars before releasing them onto the New Orleans levee. 
Planters had long complained at the «oppressive system of wharfage» that subju-
gated sugar manufacturers to sell their sugars rapidly on the levee front or pay 
storage charges. Bound to their factors «by the chain of debt» and constrained by 
«arbitrary and despotic» regulations, sugar planters evoked the metaphors of sla-
very to describe their dependency to New Orleans’ commercial elite and the ci-
ty’s mercantile facilities. The central problem lay in the reduction of the allotted 
———— 
12 Planters’ Banner, Franklin, 16 February 1856, and 30 December 1847; New Orleans Bee 
quoted in The Sugar Planter, Port Allen, 26 December 1857, and 12 December 1857; Daily Pica-
yune, New Orleans, 22 October 1858; The Weekly Comet, Baton Rouge, 9 October 1853; Southern 
Sentinel, Plaquemine, 6 March 1852, and Capitolian Vis-à-Vis, Port Allen, 23 August, 1854. 
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space for sugar on the levee. Until the late 1840s, the sugar market extended from 
Canal to Toulouse Street with a platform on which hogsheads and barrels stood 
for an indefinite period prior to sale. Exposed to the elements, often without the 
benefit of tarpaulins, the sugars deteriorated as rain and riverwater seeped into 
the casks. Mud, from a thousand feet and hooves trampling on the levee, oozed 
between the barrel staves, leaching river sediment and more into the «most deli-
cate article of produce», sugar. Following the contraction of space allotted to the 
sugar market, port officials instated the thirty-six hour sale rule; a provision that 
weakened the seller’s position still further and his/her leverage over price. Mee-
tings held by the state’s sugar planters in response to the «burdensome regula-
tions» on the levee speculated on the possibility of establishing a planter-owned 
depot for sugars at Algiers, across the Mississippi river from New Orleans, or 
upstream from the established market. The primary purpose of the depot was to 
provide sufficient storage for sugar so that no planter faced a glutted market once 
again. The logic was impeccable but predictably, the sugar elite lacked the resol-
ve to cooperate beyond holding a few preliminary meetings13. 
To be sure, planters along the Mississippi River and further west along Ba-
yous Lafourche and Teche initially responded with ardor to the proposals. But 
unity could not and did not last —planters on the left and right banks of the Mis-
sissippi haggled over the preferred location for the «sugar mart», others favored a 
depot link with the New Orleans, Opelousas, and Great Western Railroad, while 
the more radical beseeched their fellow land and labor lords to «act more inde-
pendently of New Orleans and her merchants», and not only make, but sell their 
own crops. Damning the «disorganized state» of the planter class, editorialists 
and agriculturists alike implored fellow cane growers to combine, unify, and rely 
upon self-reliance. As one sugar maker proudly announced «Union is strength». 
Yet the spirit of associationalism eventually proved too weak. Even the most 
enthusiastic editors could not mask the thin numbers at the meetings and the want 
of «brotherhood and unanimity of action» among the delegates. Bickering broke 
out between the agricultural and commercial press and the entire issue of funding 
the construction of the mart devolved into dispute. Above all, «apathy and indif-
ference» among the planters stymied the collective action required to turn the 
proposed mart into reality. Two years later, editor Henry Hyams in rural West 
Baton Rouge Parish called upon the plantocracy to fund the project by subscri-
bing to the extent of one dollar per hogshead of an average crop. But Hyams was 
astute to his readers —he knew that many shared the impression that money in-
vested in the mart «is so much thrown away». The press could only do so much, 
———— 
13 Planters’ Banner, Franklin, 28 July 1855; Houma Ceres, New Orleans, 31 January 1855; 
Baton Rouge Gazette, Baton Rouge, 26 December 1846; The Sugar Planter, Port Allen, 30 January 
1858; Opelousas Courier, Opelousas, LA, 6 October 1855; Houma Ceres, New Orleans, 13 De-
cember 1855; The Sugar Planter, Port Allen, 12 December, 1857, and Planters’ Banner, Baton 
Rouge, 4 August, 1855. 
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he continued, for the planters must «assist themselves more». Yet despite such 
counsel, the mart remained unbuilt and like the failed agricultural association, the 
empty promises of coalition and alliance failed to unite the sugar masters. The 
precariousness of sugar farming and the plantation first mentality of most Loui-
siana cane lords mitigated against collective progress. Individuality eroded co-
llectivity as slaveholders poured capital and resources into their estates; tangible 
assets in brick and mortar, muscle and sinew that reflected their wealth and mas-
tery over land, labor, and sugar. Above all, their self-identity remained anchored 
firmly to the plantation and to their role as slaveholders and labor lords. Capital 
expenditure on a plantation mansion, on more slaves, or on the latest machinery 
heightened the planters’ sense of self, though public investment did little to exalt 
their power. Such individualism in thought and action proved well suited for in-
dependent progress, private profit, and economic autonomy, but it hamstrung 
their efforts at collaboration and was unsuitable for the increasingly competitive 
market in which sugar producers operated. Furthermore, it sharpened the dicho-
tomy between the vast wealth and technical superiority of Louisiana’s sugar in-
dustry and the dearth of agricultural and commercial associations and the relative 
weakness of the state’s infrastructure. The latter received only modest attention 
or funding, while capital ostensibly flowed to the former. A thousand indepen-
dent operators and their agents accordingly jostled for position on the New Or-
leans levee; they bemoaned poor prices and glutted markets, but their social ethic 
ensured that Louisiana’s cane lords remained as price takers and not as price ma-
kers working together to their collective advantage14. 
Independence of thought and action, however, did not always work to the 
planter’s detriment. Indeed, some sugar producers —particularly larger cane 
growers— actively sought to operate outside of the New Orleans factor-merchant 
complex, transporting their sugars directly from plantation to East coast markets. 
The marketing operations of two prominent Mississippi River sugar planters 
—Wade Hampton and Maunsell White— in the 1830s and 1840s reveal a complex 
trading relationship between the producer and a network of factors and commis-
———— 
14 Thibodaux Minerva, Thibodaux, LA, 17 November 1855; The Sugar Planter, Port Allen, 
12 January 1856; Planters’ Banner, Franklin, 26 January 1856; The Sugar Planter, Port Allen, 5 
April 1856; Southern Sentinel, Plaquemine, 29 March 1856, and The Sugar Planter, Port Allen, 16 
January 1858; 23 January 1858, and 26 June 1858. On associationalism, see J.D. WELLS, The Ori-
gins of the Southern Middle Class, 1820-1861, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 
2004. Yet on the limits to collective policy, see J. HEITMANN, The Modernization of the Louisiana 
Sugar Industry, 1830-1910, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1987, pp. 40-8; D. 
DUPRE, «Ambivalent Capitalists on the Cotton Frontier: Settlement and Development in the Ten-
nessee Valley of Alabama», Journal of Southern History, 56, Hanover, Penn., 1990, pp. 215-40, 
especially pp. 237-9; B.G. BOND, Political Culture in the Nineteenth-Century South: Mississippi, 
1830-1900, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1995, pp. 66-72, and E. DAL LAGO, 
Southern Elites: A Comparative Study of the Landed Aristocracies of the American South and the 
Italian South, 1815-1860, Ph. D. Diss., London, University of London, 2000, pp. 107-110. 
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sion agents in several cities. Above all, these planters gauged relative prices and 
freight costs and strove to minimize the risks of price volatility and glutted mar-
kets by distributing their crops to several discrete markets. In so doing, they judi-
ciously spread the risks incumbent in marketing sugar. Wade Hampton’s Loui-
siana land and slaveholdings were immense, even by Caribbean standards. On 
the banks of the Mississippi River at Houmas, Wade Hampton I established a 
vast plantation kingdom that included over 400 slaves and produced 1,600 hogs-
heads of sugar per annum, valued at over $100,000. In disbursing his crop, 
Hampton judged the size and quality of the Louisiana harvest, the risks of glut-
ting the New Orleans market, the prospects of future crops and their likely effect 
on prices current; he judged the stock of sugar in the market and kept a weather-
eye on the scale and availability of Cuban imports. A poor harvest in the Matan-
zas cane fields, for instance, promised rising prices for the domestic article just as 
a sudden peak in European demand or price might prompt Cuban shippers to sail 
for Cádiz or Coruña ahead of New York. The condition of the European sugar 
market thus impacted directly on domestic producers whose short-term gains 
often rested on events and prices four thousand miles to the East. The effective-
ness of post-emancipation labor systems in the production of West Indian sugar 
similarly shaped international prices as major producers like St. Domingue and 
Jamaica dwindled, while others, such as Trinidad and Guyana rose on the 
strength of Indian indentured labor. Added to that, sugar masters like Hampton 
factored in other imponderables —the extent of ice on the Northern rivers and 
canals, for instance, proved a very real concern that might delay inland transpor-
tation or force the planter to pay additional warehouse charges. Moreover, freight 
and storage rates varied from city to city as did the terms and prices offered by 
sugar purchasers. On top of these shifting day-to-day and annual concerns, plan-
ters kept a wary-eye on Washington D.C. and returned as many pro-tariff Whigs 
to Congress as the state’s sugar interest could muster. From his desk in rural As-
cension Parish, Hampton accordingly evaluated his correspondence, judging his 
factors’ advice, acting on their prospects, and dispatching his sugars accordingly. 
The slaves who then wheeled the sugar barrels down to the jetty at Houmas and 
loaded them onto vessels bound for Baltimore, Boston, Philadelphia, and New 
York thus found themselves bound not solely to their master, but also to an 
Atlantic trading network15.  
———— 
15 On Hampton and Houmas, see R.E. BRIDWELL, The South’s Wealthiest Planter: Wade 
Hampton I of South Carolina, 1754-1835, Ph. D. Diss., Columbia, University of South Carolina, 
1980, pp. 387 and 422, and C.E. CAUTHEN (ed.), Family Letters of the Three Wade Hamptons, 
1782-1901, Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1953, p. XIII. On post-emancipation 
labor systems and sugar production, see J.H. GALLOWAY, The Sugar Cane Industry: An Historical 
Geography from its Origins to 1914, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 143-94. 
On Whiggite voting patterns, see J.M. SACHER, A Perfect War of Politics: Parties, Politicians, and 
Democracy in Louisiana, 1824-1861, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 2003, pp. 
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Strewn across Hampton’s desk lay a mass of letters from his factors and 
commission agents throughout the nation. From New York, Hampton received a 
steady stream of post from his commission agents, Goodhue & Co., detailing the 
sale of the enormous consignments of sugar that left Houmas for Manhattan. Fac-
tors Harrison and Sterrett from Baltimore, Lippincott and Richards from Phila-
delphia, and Nathaniel & J. Dick of New Orleans corresponded frequently with 
Hampton relating market conditions to their client and dispatching sales reports 
for his sugars. But it was with Goodhue that Hampton maintained his closest 
correspondence and with whom he shared detailed market information. From 
1829 to 1832, Goodhue kept his client apprised of the stock of sugar in the Nort-
hern cities, advising him on market conditions, the state and condition of his su-
gars, and the decision to warehouse his crop in the promise of improved prices 
later in the year. Given that Hampton shipped between 800 to 1000 hogsheads 
per annum to New York, Goodhue additionally dispatched ships from Manhattan 
and Baltimore to Houmas to receive the entire crop. In March 1831, for instance, 
Goodhue engaged Capt. Welsh and his recently constructed vessel, Montpelier, 
for the Hampton account. Paying slightly more than average freight charges at 
$6.25 per hogshead, Goodhue not only secured a fine ship that would expose his 
client «to the least possible risqué», but he liased with Hampton’s Philadelphia 
and Baltimore agents over contracting vessels for these markets. When they fai-
led to secure adequate shipping at an appropriate price, Goodhue stepped in and 
hired three smaller brigs for the Houmas traffic. And once the ships returned to 
New York, Goodhue made the decision to store the sugar until the market impro-
ved. Working in tandem with his Louisiana based client, Goodhue continually 
advised Hampton on the scale and condition of the Cuban, Puerto Rican, and St. 
Croix harvests, taking extra note of hurricane damage and the shifting demands 
of European markets which, on occasion, left «the home market for the Louisiana 
sugars». But, as the New Yorker fully understood, Hampton’s and Louisiana’s 
position ultimately remained vulnerable as Cuba, he concluded, is «always ready 
to make up our deficiencies with low priced brown sugar»16.  
———— 
187-9. On Caribbean crop failure, see «Goodhue & Co. to Wade Hampton I», 28 September 1829, 
and 29 June 1832. On ice, «N. & J. Dick & Co. to Wade Hampton I», 4 January 1832. On freights, 
for instance, «Harrison and Sterrett to Wade Hampton I», 8 August 1829; «Goodhue & Co. to Wa-
de Hampton», 18 March 1832; «Jesse Strong to Wade Hampton», I, 4 July 1834. On tariff con-
cerns, «Goodhue & Co. to Wade Hampton I», 25 January 1831, and 3 February 1831, all in Wade 
Hampton Papers, University of South Carolina, South Caroliniana Library, Columbia, SC (hereaf-
ter SCL). 
16 «Wade Hampton I to Goodhue & Co.», 20 July 1832. For examples of correspondence see, 
«Harrison and Sterrett to Wade Hampton I», 8 August 1829; «Goodhue & Co to John Perry», 23 
September 1829; «N. & J. Dick & Co. to Wade Hampton I», 14 November 1831; «Lipincott and 
Richards to Wade Hampton I», 25 January 1832, and «Goodhue & Co. to Wade Hampton I», 22 
April 1829 (for Boston traffic). For examples of Goodhue predicting market activity, see for instan-
ce «Goodhue & Co. to Wade Hampton I», 10 February 1831, and 23 July 1831. On volumes traded, 
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Hampton may well have ceded great responsibilities to Goodhue, but he was 
not entirely powerless. Indeed, in November 1831, he decided to market his su-
gars in New Orleans, partly due to a depressed market in New York and the rela-
tively small scale of his annual crop. Two months later, he sold his sugars 
through an alternative buyer, writing: 
 
«I begin to fear that sales in this country, other than small parcels is a diffi-
culty, if not impracticable undertaking and that I shall, in the end, be obliged to 
presume my former course of business». 
 
Having fallen out —albeit temporarily— with Dick’s consortium in New Or-
leans, he began to ship sugar to New York again. Yet within a few months, Hamp-
ton had reversed his position a further time. The low prices in the North and some 
«advantageous sales» to itinerant western buyers, he wrote to Goodhue, 
 
«Induced me to try the experiment and I succeeded in the disposal of my 
whole crop for that market. Whether I repeat the experiment or resume my 
consignments to the North», 
 
he concluded, «will depend upon prices and the respective demands». Within 
the year, however, Goodhue’s vessels returned to the Houmas as Hampton’s sla-
ves toiled along the jetty, winching the hogsheads onto the ocean going ships that 
bobbed gently on the Mississippi17. 
Described by friend William Hamilton as «a cautious, prudent, [and] discri-
minating man», Wade Hampton attempted to exercise some leverage over the 
market; he moved his sugars around the nation seeking the best price available 
after deducting relevant freight and storage charges. Goodhue, likewise, held 
back his agent’s crop when prices proved disappointing and endeavoured to secu-
re the best return the market could offer. But even Hampton and Goodhue opera-
ted as price takers. Notwithstanding federal tariff protection and international 
competition, the vagaries of global pricing and unstable markets powerfully in-
fluenced Hampton’s profits. Despite his best efforts, Hampton ultimately failed 
to control the market with the same degree of success as he mastered his land and 
slave crews. Much like Hampton, Maunsell White similarly marketed his sugars 
———— 
see «Goodhue & Co. to Wade Hampton I», 10 July 1834. On the Montpelier, see «Goodhue & Co. 
to Wade Hampton I», 8, 9, 14, 18, 29, and 30 March 1831; 6 April 1831, and 17 May 1831, and 
«Goodhue & Co. to William J. Geiger», 12 March 1831. On Cuban and other Caribbean imports 
see, «Goodhue & Co. to Wade Hampton I», 3 August 1831; 19 November 1831, 29 June 1832, and 
30 November 1829, and «Harrison and Sterrett to Wade Hampton I», 26 September 1831, Wade 
Hampton Papers, SCL. 
17 «Wade Hampton to N. J. Dick & Co.», 17 November 1831, and 29 January 1832; «N. & J. 
Dick to Wade Hampton», 30 January 1832, and 4 February 1832, and «Wade Hampton to Goodhue 
& Co.», 20 July 1832, Wade Hampton Papers, SCL. 
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nationally, maintaining close links with Dunlop, Moncure & Co. in Richmond, 
Robert Patterson in Philadelphia, and on occasion with John Kraft in Memphis. 
Shipping his sugars direct from his estate in Plaquemines Parish to Northern 
markets or selling direct from the plantation when prices, freights, and market 
conditions favored it, White bemoaned «this loosing business» where poor pri-
ces, high interest rates for negotiating bills of exchange, and incompetent freigh-
ters frustrated his operations. Occasionally dispatching his sugars for the British 
market though more frequently marketing his goods in the Northeast, White wo-
rried about sugar deterioration on the long sea trips to Philadelphia and continua-
lly seethed about a credit system that «will ruin any country». These, he bluntly 
added, are, 
 
«The reflections of a man who looks a little further ahead than the mere 
matter of the day or the trifling difference of a few cents». 
 
Indeed, from White’s perspective, independence of thought and action proved 
essential for business success. «I am one of those», he declared, 
 
«Who believe in protecting myself independent of any aid from the go-
vernment by using skill, industry, and economy». 
 
For White, much like Hampton, individualism ensured one’s flexibility in the 
market, but it also divorced him from the ethos of associationalism that the local 
press clamoured for18. 
Few planters, of course, possessed the financial muscle of Wade Hampton or 
Maunsell White and few commission agents enjoyed such large marketing con-
tracts as Goodhue or Patterson. Most sugar producers found themselves in a con-
siderably weaker position, funnelling their sugars through New Orleans and ac-
cepting —albeit grudgingly— the merchants’ price. And when they shipped their 
sugars direct to the North, they often unwittingly glutted the market and inevita-
bly drove prices down. As Maunsell White grumbled, «everyone has a rush to be 
the first in market». Indeed, so serious was the planters tendency to ship en masse 
to a single market that the St. Louis Intelligencer specifically warned sugar pro-
———— 
18 «William S. Hamilton to John Hamilton», 12 April 1811, quoted in R.E. BRIDWELL [15], p. 
382; «Maunsell White to Robert Patterson & Co.», 6 July 1846, and 18 September 1846; «Maunsell 
White to Hamilton Smith», 17 September 1849, and «Maunsell White to John Kraft», 24 January 
1850. On shipping difficulties, see «Maunsell White to Robert Patterson & Co.», 29 May 1846, and 
«Maunsell White to Dunlop, Moncure & Co.», 2 February 1848, and 16 May 1848; On exchange 
rates, also see «Maunsell White to Robert Patterson & Co.», 23 June 1846; On shipping to England 
and deterioration, «Maunsell White to Robert Patterson & Co.», 28 July 1846, Maunsell White 
Papers, University of North Carolina, Southern Historical Collection, Chapel Hill, NC (hereafter 
(UNC). For other accounts of shipping to England, see Baton Rouge Gazette, Baton Rouge, 9 Au-
gust 1845, and Le Messager, Bringier, 28 April 1854. 
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ducers in December 1852 to «exercise a little more discretion in sending such 
heavy consignments» to a city whose principal trade links were frozen during the 
winter months. With a «ruinously low» market, the Intelligencer cautioned their 
southern patrons that 
 
«St. Louis cannot sell or consume all the sugar and molasses produced in 
Louisiana —particularly at this season of the year». 
 
Despite such counsel, planters nevertheless faced few alternatives; with escala-
ting debts they either sold on plantation, shipped to distant markets with higher 
freight costs, or consigned their sugars to a New Orleans factor, frequently the sa-
me commission merchant who forwarded the relevant supplies for the year’s plan-
ting and lent his credit for capital acquisition, be it land, labor, or machinery. Mo-
reover, for many cane planters on the Mississippi River, its tributaries, and Bayou 
Lafourche, the geographical proximity and relative ease of transport to New Or-
leans made it the preferred sugar market, irrespective of its many shortcomings. As 
such, from 1840 to 1860, between 45 and 60 percent of Louisiana’s crop was sold 
on the New Orleans levee; the remainder sold to retail merchants in the country or 
shipped North. For those who sold their sugars locally, steam packets served most 
of the cane region, ploughing their way through the waterways of south Louisiana, 
linking relatively isolated settlements with the New Orleans levee front. Planter 
William Pugh underscored the centrality of the steam packets when he observed 
that from his plantation on Bayou Lafourche, he consistently succeeded in shipping 
his crop to market even during low water. With one steam packet that made daily 
trips to Donaldsonville on the Mississippi and a weekly steam service to New Or-
leans, Pugh noted that he usually paid between $1.25 and $2 to ship a hogshead of 
sugar to New Orleans and that after twelve years of marketing his sugar in such a 
manner, he could not recall ever charging his insurance companies a cent for 
damage during shipping. Not all producers were as sanguine about the excellence 
of Louisiana’s packets or the ease of navigating through snags and accumulated 
drift-wood as Pugh, though the established river-borne transportation network 
effectively cemented the planters’ ties with New Orleans. And critically, sugar 
producers like Pugh could accurately plan on sales and establish a rudimentary 
timetable for marketing their produce19. 
———— 
19 «Maunsell White to Dunlop, Moncure, & Co.», 22 February 1845, Manusell White Papers, 
UNC; «St. Louis Intelligencer», 22 December 1852, quoted in Southern Sentinel, Plaquemine, 7 
January 1853, and Planters’ Banner, Franklin, 14 March 1850. For detailed records on marketing 
in St. Louis, see vol. 34. Estate Record Book, 1848-1855, Gay (Edward J.) & Family Papers, LSU. 
Annual volume of sugar marketed in New Orleans from J.C. SITTERSON [11], p. 194. On difficulties 
of transportation, see J.C. SITTERSON [11], p. 195; P.F. PASKOFF, «Hazard Removal on the Western 
Rivers as a Problem of Public Policy», Louisiana History, 40, Lafayette, 1999, pp. 261-82; D.J. 
MILLET, «The Saga of Water Transportation into Southwest Louisiana to 1900», Louisiana History, 
15, Lafayette, 1974, pp. 339-56, and T.A. BECNEL, The Barrow Family and the Barataria and 
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For planters in western parts of the antebellum sugar country, transportation 
difficulties with New Orleans motivated many operators to freight their sugars 
directly to the Atlantic seaboard. Primarily located along the rich soils of Bayou 
Teche, planters in the westerly Attakapas region (St. Mary and St. Martin Paris-
hes) increased production from almost 27,000 hogsheads in 1850 to 37,000 in 
1855 and to 65,0000 during the bumper 1861 harvest. Proportionally, the Attaka-
pas produced between 12 and 16 percent of the entire Louisiana crop. And in 
1860, census enumerators counted 84 major sugar planters in St. Mary Parish 
alone; these land and labor lords held on average over 100 slaves in bondage, 
they cultivated some 600 acres in cane (for grinding) and corn (for domestic con-
sumption), and produced almost 260 hogsheads of sugar on each estate. All told, 
the Attakapas region was home to between 17 and 20 percent of Louisiana’s lar-
gest sugar barons and a substantial zone of late antebellum cane farming. The 
entire region, however, was relatively isolated from the shipping traffic that na-
vigated the Mississippi and its tributaries. Steamers ferried the route between 
Franklin on Bayou Teche and New Orleans, for instance, but the trip of 420 miles 
took four days as ships ran aground in low water, lost position during floods, and 
gingerly navigated through the lakes of the Atchafalaya swamplands. As one 
correspondent bluntly noted, the trials of shipping sugar from the Teche to New 
Orleans «are the next thing to martyrdom». From the mid-1820s, however, Ba-
you Teche was cleared of obstructions for steamboat navigation, converting the 
sluggish waters into a dynamic trade artery. Astute to their widening marketing 
opportunities, planters along the Teche followed Wade Hampton’s example and 
freighted their sugars to distant markets along the Gulf and Atlantic seaboards. 
Sugar lords John Moore and William F. Weeks, for example, shipped their con-
siderable crops to Charleston, Savannah, Baltimore, and Mobile, while John and 
William Palfrey of Ricahoc Plantation dispatched their sugars to New York, Phi-
ladelphia, Baltimore, and Richmond. Neighbors Moses Liddell and Francis Du-
bose Richardson of Bayside Plantation similarly kept a wary eye on domestic 
markets, conveying their sugars to the Northeast when the market favored it, or 
when specific debts fell due, or disposing of their crop with Western buyers when 
glutted markets promised poor remuneration. None of these planting concerns, 
however, entirely evaded the New Orleans market. The relatively lower freight 
costs of $2 to $3 per hogshead to New Orleans against $5 for Philadelphia and 
———— 
Lafourche Canal: The Transportation Revolution in Louisiana, 1829-1925, Baton Rouge, Louisia-
na State University Press, 1989, pp. 41-65. For examples and accounts of planters marketing their 
sugars through New Orleans, see «Accounts of James P. Bowman with W. & D. Urquhart», April 
1855 to January 1857, Turnbull-Bowman Family Papers, LSU; Annual Sugar Sales for «Account 
Lewis Stirling with Factors Kelly, Conyngham & Co., Cammack, Squires, and West, A. Miltenber-
ger & Co., W. & D. Urquhart», November 1850 to March 1860, Stirling (Lewis & Family) Papers, 
LSU, and «William Hewes to Andrew McCollam», July 1852 to November 1854, McCollam (An-
drew & Ellen E.) Papers, UNC. 
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New York could, on occasion, erase any price advantage in the Eastern port ci-
ties. Whether on Weeks’ Grand Côte plantation or along the Teche, slaves accor-
dingly loaded consignments of sugar onto packets that steamed into the Atchafa-
laya and onto coastal schooners that departed for the pilot stations at the mouth of 
the Mississippi and thence to merchants in the Crescent City20.  
From the offices of Franklin’s Planters’ Banner, editors Robert Wilson and 
Daniel Dennett looked out over a thriving port. As they announced in 1851, «no 
inland southern town of the size presents the business, life-like appearance of 
Franklin». Northern produce in the local stores added lustre to the town’s increa-
singly cosmopolitan identity, exemplified by its macadamized streets and vibrant 
docks. The shouts and laughs of the draymen hauling sugar hogsheads over those 
paved streets must have resonated through the late winter and spring months 
when planters dispatched their sugars to Franklin’s quayside. Irish brogue mixed 
with English, German, and Creole French to create linguistic and racial dissonan-
ce on the wharves of Bayou Teche where free workers rubbed shoulders with the 
enslaved. Toiling among the jetties and piers, Franklin’s waterfront workers en-
countered crews from across the nation, forging a dynamic (though no doubt oc-
casionally violent) social space that spilt into local hostelries and the perhaps 
inevitable bragging, banter, and fights. As Mikhail Bakhtin observes, «the most 
intense and productive life of culture takes place on the boundaries». And on 
Franklin’s antebellum quays, those boundaries were readily apparent, be they 
racial, linguistic, religious, cultural, ethnic, ideological, or political21. 
———— 
20 M.E. REED, «Footnote to the Coastwise Trade —Some Teche Planters and their Atlantic 
Factors», Louisiana History, nº 3, Lafayette, 1967, pp. 191-7; P.A. CHAMPOMIER [3], 1844-1845, 
1850-1851, 1855-1856, 1861-1862; and J.K. MENN, The Large Slaveholders of Louisiana —1860, 
New Orleans, Pelican Books, 1964, pp. 7, and 376-89. Additionally, see R. FOLLETT and R, HAL-
PERN, Documenting the Louisiana Sugar Harvest, 1844-1877 (www.utoronto.ca/csus/sugar). On 
transportation difficulties, see J.L. DE GRUMMOND, «A Social History of St. Mary Parish, 1845-
1860», Louisiana Historical Quarterly, 32, New Orleans, 1949, pp. 22 and 46. For examples of 
coastal services and ‘interior’ packets between New Orleans and the Attakapas, see Planters’ Ban-
ner, Franklin, 6 December 1845. Trading information from: «William F. Weeks to John Moore», 
13 May, 1852, and 4 January 1853; «Julius Johnson to John Moore», 12 March, 1852, and 23 De-
cember 1852; «J. Tupper & Son. to John Moore», 12 March 1856, and «W.H. Burroughs to John 
Moore», 18 March 1856, Weeks (David & Family) Papers, LSU; «Plantation Diary 1842-1859», 
vol. 17; William Palfrey and George D. Palfrey Account Books, Palfrey Family Papers, LSU; «Mo-
ses Liddell to Jackson, Todd & Co.», 19 March 1847; «Moses Liddell to St. John R. Liddell», 13 
October 1847; 27 December 1847; 5 December, 1848, and 10 December 1851, and «Moses Liddell 
to Mary M. Liddell», 23 November 1851, Liddell (Moses, St. John R. & Family) Papers, LSU. 
21 Planters’ Banner, Franklin, 29 March 1851, quoted in J.L. DE GRUMMOND [20], pp. 19-23 
and 52. On violence in Franklin’s «grog shops», see Planters’ Banner, Franklin, 6 June 1850, and 
V.W. MCGEE, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays by M.M.Bakhtin, Austin, University of Texas 
Press, 1986, p. 2 (ed. And trans. C. Emerson and M. Holquist). On drink, fighting, and working-
class identity, see R. ROZENWEIG, Eight Hours for What We Will: Workers and Leisure in an Indus-
trial City, Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Press, 1983, pp. 61-64, and P. WAY, «La-
bour’s Love Lost: Observations on the Historiography of Class and Ethnicity in the Nineteenth 
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The stevedores, who frequented the taverns after stowing thousand pound hogs-
heads under deck, scrambled over brigs and ocean going schooners from Baltimore, 
New York, Boston, Mobile, Charleston, Richmond, and Philadelphia. While access 
to these markets satisfied even the most price-conscious sugar master, ships from 
Havana, Kingston, Bermuda, St. Croix, and Nassau also lay at anchor along Fran-
klin’s narrow wharves. Firmly integrated within the Atlantic sugar economy, the 
denizens of this small town watched the volume of trade reported at Franklin increa-
se sharply during the antebellum era. In 1847 for instance, 71 coastwise vessels and 
9 foreign registered ships entered the port of Franklin during the year. On the 70 
ships that cleared the harbormaster and left Bayou Teche for the Gulf of Mexico, 
ship crews packed away 6,735 hogsheads of sugar, 1,671 barrels of molasses, and 
almost 31,000 feet of live oak timber. The following year, however, the Planters’ 
Banner reported that 96 schooners and 29 brigs sailed into Franklin from port cities 
in the United States while 32 foreign vessels docked at the harbor wall. By New 
Year’s Eve, 1848, 157 ships displacing 19,916 tons set their sails and left the com-
motion of Franklin where the 941 crewmen who visited the town during the year 
must have filled not only the local streets but also the coffers of saloon owners who 
stood to gain from their thirsty patrons. Conversing in a myriad of languages and 
accents, these crewmen stored in the holds of the ships, 16,589 hogsheads of sugar, 
19,664 barrels of molasses, and over 55,000 feet of timber. By 1853, the port of 
Franklin reported 126 departures during the calendar year though the vessels that 
passed through the harbor gates weighed an average of 158 tons per ship, an increa-
se of over 31 tons per vessel from 1848. While fewer, though larger, ships called at 
the port of Franklin, over 19,000 hogsheads of sugar and 41,194 barrels of molasses 
left the town for the Atlantic seaboard and Gulf coast markets. Intricately binding 
Bayou Teche with Battery Park in New York City, ship chandlers in Franklin outfit-
ted a marketing operation that proved international in scope though one that rested 
firmly on the growing national demand for sugar22. 
By the mid 1850s, the promise of a railroad link between New Orleans and 
the Attakapas seemingly promised a resolution to the planters’ marketing diffi-
———— 
Century», Journal of American Studies, 28, Cambridge, UK, 1994, pp. 1-22. On the social signifi-
cance of bragging see E.J. GORN, «‘Gouge and Bite, Pull Hair and Scratch’: The Social Significan-
ce of Fighting in the Southern Backcountry,’» American Historical Review, 90, Durham, 1985, pp. 
18-43, especially 28-33, and R.D.G. KELLEY, «Rethinking Black Working-Class Opposition in the 
Jim Crow South», Journal of American History, 80, Urbana, Ill., 1993, pp. 86-7. And on the cultu-
ral politics of black maritime workers, see W.J. BOLSTER, Black Jacks: African American Seamen 
in the Age of Sail, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1997, and D.S. CECELSKI, The 
Waterman’s Song: Slavery and Freedom in Maritime North Carolina, Chapel Hill, University of 
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Waterfront Workers of New Orleans: Race, Class, and Politics, 1863-1923, Urbana, University of 
Illinois Press, 1994. 
22 Planters’ Banner, Franklin, 21 December 1848; 8 February 1849, and 5 January 1854, and 
J.L. DE GRUMMOND [20], p. 53. 
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culties. The New Orleans, Opelousas, and Great Western Railroad struck west 
from its terminus on the banks of the Mississippi at Algiers across sugar cane 
rich St. Charles and Lafourche Parish, before turning to the North and heading up 
Bayou Teche toward central portion of the state. To those who supported the 
NOOGWR, the rail link seemed to proffer wealth and a promising future that 
would speed western sugars to the New Orleans levee for $2.50 per hogshead. 
Predictably, the Planters’ Banner did not shy from local boosterism, proclaiming 
that the railroad «will be the mainspring of a new spirit of enterprise [...] infused 
into the country». And for the first year of the railroads’ incorporation, planters 
along the route invested some $760,000 in private subscription. Construction, 
however, slowed and costs escalated as navvies labored on silty and geologically 
unstable soils. Hamstrung by the lack of sufficient funding and a perhaps overly 
grandiose scheme, the NOOGWR failed to attract adequate support. By 1857, 
private investors furnished only 20 percent of the construction costs. Of the 
three-quarters of a million dollars initially promised by rural planters residing 
along the railroad, just $250,000 was actually paid. Once again, Louisiana plan-
ters failed to unite and invest in a co-operative exercise. As Moses Liddell well 
understood, the «enormous and continuous» expenses incurred in sugar produc-
tion promoted an essentially individualistic outlook, but behind his opposition to 
the NOOGWR lay a deep suspicion of being ‘nabobed over’ by the New Orleans 
merchants a further time. The railroad, he wrote his son, «is more or less inten-
ded to promote the interest of New Orleans», by diverting trade there, and redu-
cing the shipment of Teche sugars to the North. Every hogshead of sugar passing 
through New Orleans, he added, «leaves a share of its value» in the hands of the 
merchant middlemen, whose commission (2 ½ percent on sales) rarely altered23. 
Liddell’s unease at associationalism, be it in marketing his sugar or over in-
ternal improvements, was born of deep reticence to communal progress. As Ja-
mes Hanna cautioned fellow planters: 
 
«There is probably no interest in the United States, of the same importance, 
so much neglected by those engaged in its culture, or so much preyed upon [...] 
as the sugar interest of Louisiana; and there is probably none which so much 
requires combined energy and care in the promotion of its interests. While all 
———— 
23 On railroad building, see M.E. REED, New Orleans and the Railroads: The Struggle for 
Commercial Empire, 1830-1860, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1966; «A Century 
of Progress in Louisiana, 1852-1952», Southern Pacific Bulletin, S. Diego, October 1952, pp. 1-55, 
and W. PRICHARD (ed.), «A Forgotten Louisiana Engineer: G. W. R. Bayley and his ‘History of the 
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other branches of industry are cared for by the associated efforts of those en-
gaged in them, we are content to let the sugar interest float along on the current 
of daily events, and let it take its chance for good or ill, giving ourselves, co-
llectively, very little concern about it». 
 
Yet despite such admonition, the slaveholding barons rarely collaborated for 
their mutual good. Receiving his sales account, the sugar planter, one columnist 
added, 
 
«Wonders at the state of the market, sits down[,] swears some —same old 
story— market down [...] and after a long drawn sigh, concludes —‘There is 
no balm in Gilead’». 
 
Like Jeremiah’s lament, there was no healing of the planters’ woes either. 
Although they could not adequately supply the domestic sugar market and faced 
overlapping difficulties in competing with their Caribbean rivals, Louisiana’s 
plantocracy nevertheless shouldered some of the responsibility for their vulnera-
ble position. Not infrequently, they glutted markets with sugars, competing with 
one another to freight their produce at the earliest convenience, and suppressed 
prices by marketing en masse. To be fair, they had few alternatives given the 
pressing demands of their creditors, their lack of detailed commercial informa-
tion, and the allegedly wayward advice of New Orleans’ merchant community. 
Yet, when given the opportunity to act in unison, be it the Louisiana sugar mart 
or the Attakapas railroad, the planting community failed to protect their long-
term interests. The volatility of sugar production, in this northern outcrop of the 
Caribbean cane world, certainly mitigated against far-reaching economic forecas-
ting and the planters’ relative isolation and prosperity both hindered the forma-
tion of alliances and concurrently lessened their need. Given the vagaries of the 
crop, climate, and market, the planters’ self-absorbed and independent commer-
cialism proved relatively prudent, though their social ethic ultimately restrained 
progress in Louisiana’s cane world. As Frederick Law Olmsted tellingly noted, 
 
«There was certainly progress and improvement at the South [...] but it was 
much more limited, and less calculated upon than at the North». 
 
Pressing his point further, the travelling New Yorker deduced that there was 
«no atmosphere of progress and improvement». By contrast, «there was a cons-
tant electric current of progress» in the North, but in the South, «every second 
man was a non-conductor and broke the chain». Louisiana’s slaveholding sugar 
lords proved no different; raised in a culture that privileged individualism, perso-
nal integrity, social standing, and human mastery, southern planters were ill-
disposed to cede their independence to any-one or any group. Ideologically and 
culturally bound to the social values of slaveholding, Louisiana’s plantocracy 
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maintained that personal liberty rested on economic autonomy and the virulent 
protection of one’s property rights. The realities of business suggested otherwise, 
with independent planters exercising remarkably little leverage over the market, 
but as Jeffrey Young has recently argued, southern slavemasters often viewed 
their lives through a fictive lens by which they banished the gross truths of ante-
bellum life and dwelled on their idealized role as masters. Louisiana’s elite deve-
loped a commercial corollary to this social ethic, one that condoned independent 
market behavior, but truncated nineteenth-century notions of associationalism 
and progress. The sugar barons accordingly hoisted themselves upon a petard of 
their own making; committed to independence, they denied the possibilities of 
collectivism, and toiled in the sugar market as individuals. Buffeted by icy winds 
from the North, troubled by Congressional tariff debates, and overwhelmed by 
Caribbean competition, Louisiana’s cane lords found themselves stranded and 
alone, culturally ill-prepared to confront the market24. 
 
 
 
Before the United States Civil War, Louisiana’s sugar production grew from barely noticiable 
amounts to 264.000 Tons due to an increase in both domestic consumption and output capacity. It 
proved unable, however, to counteract the expansion of Caribbean exports. This study contends 
that the slave-owning «hacendados» had to operate in a very dynamic market in which they were 
culturally ill-prepared to compete. Their ethics based on individualism and sense of independence 
deriving from their slave-owning condition, was an obstacle for associative efforts. Thus they acted 
on an article-by-article trade strategy, causing demand saturation and price dumping which led to 
the weakening of their individual and collective position in the sugar trade. 
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